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ABSTRACT 
U.S. military bases in Japan have dealt with differing levels of controversy since the end 
of World War II. Since the mid-1990s, this has been especially true of Okinawa. After the 
1995 rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl, protests aimed at closing the Marine Corps Air 
Station at Futenma have received an unprecedented amount of media attention. This 
thesis examines the relative level of controversy at four different U.S. installations: 
MCAS Futenma, Kadena Air Base, Naval Station Yokosuka, and MCAS Iwakuni. It 
identifies five causal factors: historical anti-militarism, major crimes, civil nuisance, 
aviation safety, and community profile. I assess the impact of these factors at the four 
installations and assign a relative level of controversy to each of the bases. 
I found that Futenma is the most controversial. It is followed closely by its 
neighbor, Kadena. Next, due to its nature as an aviation facility, is Iwakuni. Yokosuka is, 
by a fairly wide margin, the least controversial of the four cases. The historical anti-
militarism endemic to Okinawa is the primary driver of controversy in Japanese base 
politics, while aviation safety concerns and community profile are also significant. Major 
crimes, despite the media focus generate little controversy by themselves. 
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Many have studied and written about the tenor of base politics in Japan. The focus 
of such study and discussion has overwhelmingly centered on the highly controversial 
bases in Okinawa. My purpose in this thesis is to conduct a comparative study of the base 
community relations across four different installations: Marine Corps Air Station 
(MCAS) Futenma, Naval Station Yokosuka, Kadena Air Force Base, and Marine Corps 
Air Station Iwakuni. I find that, while it is true that tensions at MCAS Futenma are 
indeed high, tensions at Kadena are lower and those at Iwakuni are lower still. Yokosuka 
is, to a great extent, a model of pacific base–community relations. This is all in spite of 
the reality that these facilities all share some certain factors that could exercise a 
deleterious effect on the base–community relationship. I argue that the level of 
controversy at different U.S. installations varies greatly depending on a number of 
factors, many of which are not usually examined in the academic literature. Is there any 
basis to the Kent Calder’s assertion that the Naval Base at Yokosuka is subject to the 
same level of anti-base sentiment and demonstration as controversial bases in Okinawa,1 
or is the base–community in Yokosuka actually significantly less controversial? How 
controversial are any of the bases in an absolute sense? 
This thesis will address two main questions. The first is a simple question of 
measurement. Exactly how strained are base–community relations at different bases in 
Japan? Second, although it may seem obvious that Okinawa presents a “different animal” 
from the rest of the bases in Japan, I have found there to be substantial differences in 
levels of tension between bases in not just an Okinawa vs. Mainland comparison, but in a 
Futenma vs. Kadena and Yokosuka vs. Iwakuni comparison as well, so what factors 
account for that? Having spent my last tour in Yokosuka, my experience is that Yokosuka 
is considerably less tense than many of the other facilities around the country. My further 
research has supported this impression. Many of the factors commonly cited as causes of 
the very well documented tension in Okinawa are present in bases throughout Japan. 
                                                 
1. Kent Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 122. 
 2 
Given the shared factors that could be said to cause base–community controversy, why is 
it that one base is fraught with tension and besieged by protest and controversy while 
others might be more quiet? I intend to demonstrate that the level of tension surrounding 
a given base is determined less by major crimes that get the most academic and media 
attention, but rather by pacifist politics and aircraft noise. I also argue that the more 
cosmopolitan a given area is, the less likely one is to find a strong anti-base movement. 
Hence, Yokosuka, in the Tokyo metro area is less tense while Futenma, located in the 
poorest and least economically and demographically diverse prefecture in the country, is 
more tense. 
Particularly in light of the much vaunted “Pivot to Asia,” the importance of the 
answers to these two questions would be difficult to overstate.2 The United States’ 
relationship with its longest standing and staunchest Asian ally is both dependent on and 
profoundly affected by the status of forward deployed forces on Japanese soil. Tensions 
surrounding the bases on Okinawa have sown deep doubts about the future of the 
alliance.3 As the home of the U.S. 7th Fleet, Yokosuka in particular is of vital strategic 
importance to the United States and Japan. If levels of tension there were as high as those 
found in Okinawa, the prospects for a successful “pivot” would be considerably dimmer 
than they are today. In the light of the results of my thesis, policy makers should be able 
to make more informed decisions about base–community relations and be better able to 
manage problems when they arise. 
However, little effort has been expended on an actual attempt to get an objective 
measurement of the level of tension. Without an accurate assessment of the actual level 
of tension surrounding a given facility, it is impossible for policy makers, military 
officials and public affairs professionals to understand whether or not given measures are 
having any effect. Additionally, policy responses to a perceived level of tension that is 
higher than the actual level, even if well-intentioned, is at least a waste of resources and 
could even prove to be counter-productive. While the controversy surrounding Okinawa, 
                                                 
2. Bruce Klingner and Dean Cheng, “U.S. Asian Policy: America’s Security Commitment to Asia 
Needs More Forces,” Backgrounder 2715 (August 2012). 
3. Gavan McCormack, “The U.S.–Japan ‘Alliance’, Okinawa, and Three Looming Elections,” The 
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, accessed November 16, 2012. 
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specifically Marine Corps Air Station Futenma is certainly unambiguous, it has yet to be 
quantified in any meaningful way. More importantly, the perennial uproar surrounding 
Okinawan bases has essentially drowned any meaningful conversation about the 
remaining bases in the rest of Japan. 
It is of inherent value to establish first an objective assessment for the levels of 
tension at various facilities. Without this, progress in either direction, either improving or 
deteriorating base–community relations, is not as detectable as would be desired. Second, 
investigating whether or not the rest of Japan follows the Okinawa model of acrimonious 
controversy or, in contrast, tends to be enjoy more harmonious base–community relations 
could determine the nature of the threat to the overall alliance. Unfortunately, due to the 
lack of extant research on this topic, and the lack of record keeping in terms of size and 
number of protests at three of the four case studies (Yokosuka is the exception), a true 
quantitative analysis has proven to be beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I believe 
that through the conduct of my interviews with various public affairs professionals, 
journalists, and academics, I have been able to at least clearly establish a ranking of 
which of the four case studies are more controversial than others. 
While it may be easily recognized by those conversant in Japan–U.S. relations 
that there is an obvious and substantial difference between bases on the mainland and 
bases in Okinawa, a casual assessment of opinion in the academic literature and the 
“talk” of “future policy makers” reveals something less than a consensus on this. It 
sometimes appears to be commonly assumed, though never explicitly stated, that all 
bases in Japan share the problems that plague the bases in Okinawa. Is it a bases in Japan 
problem? Or is it more accurately an Okinawa Mondai (Okinawa Problem)? Alexander 
Cooley, Kent Calder, and Andrew Yeo have all recently published books on base politics 
and only Calder gives even cursory attention to any of the facilities in mainland Japan.4 
These are generally regarded to the definitive books on the subject of base–community 
relations. Given the tremendous focus on the problems in Okinawa and the lack of 
                                                 
4. Calder, Embattled Garrisons; Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change 
and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
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interest in and study of any of the other bases, one could be forgiven for developing the 
impression that the Okinawa model typifies base–community relations throughout the 
country. While the problems in Okinawa certainly cause problems for the U.S.–Japan 
alliance, a significantly lower level of tension in Yokosuka, home of U.S. 7th Fleet and 
perhaps the most important of all U.S. overseas bases, could indicate that there is less to 
fear than alarmists would have us believe. Perhaps even more important than the 
differences to be found between bases on Okinawa and the mainland, are the differences 
in tension levels between the other bases in mainland Japan. In particular, Yokosuka 
appears to be less tense than Iwakuni. Discovering the causes of this difference in tension 
will be helpful in shaping the future of base-host community interaction for all bases in 
Japan. 
The answer to these questions could and should influence policy decisions on 
both sides of the alliance, politically for the two governments and organizationally for the 
military and the base commanders themselves. 
A primary problem raised by these questions, as will be demonstrated in the 
literature review that follows, is the fundamental lack of any investigation into the level 
of tension to be found in bases outside of Okinawa. Even in Okinawa, there is a plethora 
of research and reporting on tensions that exist, but little discussion of the actual level of 
tension. We can assume that it is high in that there is much reporting on it, but has it 
increased or decreased over the last five years? What about the last five decades? 
My research confirms that the bases in Okinawa do indeed suffer from a high 
level of tension surrounding their presence on the archipelago. However, my research as 
well as my experience as an officer stationed at Yokosuka from November of 2009 to 
June of 2011, indicates that there is a lower level of tension there than in Okinawa. In 
fact, Yokosuka appears to have the best base–community relations of any of the cases I 
examined. It is vital to note that while a lower level of tension than one finds in Okinawa 
is arguably to be expected (despite the presence of many potential controversy generating 
factors), Yokosuka is also less tense than Iwakuni, which shares Yokosuka’s mainland 
location. 
 5 
Many factors are often cited as the cause of tension in Okinawa and the 
controversy that is reported about overseas bases in Japan in general. The problems 
associated with it range from aircraft noise to petty crime, from the threat (once or twice 
actually realized) of aircraft mishaps endangering the civilian population to, most 
horrifically, the violent sexual assault and murder of a teenage girl. Additionally, the fact 
that the Marines stationed on Okinawa deploy outside of Japan to do violence 
independent of Tokyo’s wishes places Okinawa at risk of becoming the target of a strike 
from one of the United States’ potential co-belligerents regardless of Japan’s stance in 
any potential conflict. 
However, Yokosuka shares all of these factors. Even if Okinawa is revealed to be 
(as expected) much more controversial than Yokosuka (or any of the other bases on the 
mainland), it would appear that of all the factors influencing the level of tension for a 
particular base, some are more important or influential than others. Yokosuka is also 
home to a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, nuclear power being an issue of perennial 
heartache in Japan (even more so after the disaster at the Fukushima power plant in early 
2012).5 The USS George Washington could easily be expected to trigger mass public 
outcry and protest. However, despite sharing all these factors with Okinawa and other 
troubled bases, Yokosuka turns out to enjoy a more benign relationship with the 
surrounding community than both Okinawan bases and bases in the mainland. This 
indicates that some of these factors are less important that commonly thought in causing 
tension in base–community relations and that some less looked at factors are at work. 
The U.S. military maintains more than 80 installations of various sizes throughout 
the country. Do they all share the same “level of contention?” While the “face-value” 
answer to this question is “no,” there are some scholars, particularly Kent Calder in 
Embattled Garrisons, who argue that the level of tension in Kanagawa Prefecture and the 
level of tension in Okinawa are both “high.”6 It seems at least arguable that if all these 
facilities generated the kind of civil and diplomatic turbulence produced by the Futenma 
                                                 
 5. Justin McCurry, “Japan Plans to End Reliance on Nuclear Power in 30 Years,” Guardian, 
September 14, 2012. 
6. Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 122. 
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Mondai (Futenma Problem), not only would Futenma be closed, but the alliance as a 
whole would face higher levels of tension and seriously complicate efforts to pursue 
American interests in the western Pacific. 
Clearly, as Tobias Harris asserts in a 2008 post on his Observing Japan blog, 
[I]t is a mistake to view the U.S. forward presence in Japan uniformly. 
Okinawa is not Iwakuni is not Yokosuka: each area has its own dynamics 
depending on the population size and service, origin of service personnel, 
the size and density of the host community, the scale of the U.S. bases, the 
presence of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel, and the host 
community’s history as a military base.7 
Again, the lack of research covering non-Okinawan bases could lead one to 
believe that Okinawa is typical of the experience of both American service members and 
Japanese nationals living in “base communities.” However, a simple Google search in 
Japanese for Yokosuka Base Problem (横須賀基地 問題) generates 327,000 results in 
0.12 seconds. That is pretty impressive, however a similar search for Futenma Base 
Problem (普天間基地 問題) delivers a staggering 3,940,000 hits. This is an admittedly 
crude metric, but the order of magnitude difference suggests at least that the possibility 
that contrasting Yokosuka with Futenma offers something more than a distinction 
without a difference. 
An English search reveals a less stark difference in the actual numbers, 442,000 to 
619,000 with Yokosuka actually generating more hits. However, the nature of the hits is 
laughably different. The first hit is a thread on www.japanbases.com where American 
personnel are complaining about the overly aggressive seahawks on base. The remainder 
of the first page of search results reveals complaints from base personnel about area 
hotels, the speed limit on base, and the on base travel agent. There is not a single search 
result even remotely related to community opposition to the base (unless the seahawks, 
Tonbi (鳶) count as community). The Futenma search results in contrast are exclusively  
                                                 
7. Tobias Harris, “Observing Japan,” accessed May 30, 2012, 
http://www.observingjapan.com/2008/04/yokosuka-is-different.html. 
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centered around the base controversy with titles like “Dangerous Futenma Base Must Not 
Become Permanent” from the Yomiuri Shinbun or “Noda Must Rethink Futenma Issue 
from Scratch” from the Asahi Shinbun.8 
There is more than Google to let us know that there is a long history of 
controversy surrounding U.S. bases in Okinawa. It is essentially a history that extends all 
the way back to 1 April 1945 when U.S. Marines set foot on the beaches of Okinawa and 
initiated the 81 day conflict that constituted the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War.9 
Since that time, not a day has gone by without Marines on the island, first as invaders, 
then as occupiers, and finally as “guests.” 
However, controversy is not absent in the history of the other bases in mainland 
Japan. Immediately upon ratification of the U.S.–Japan Security Agreement in April of 
1952, more than a million protesters staged demonstrations across Japan to express 
opposition to continued American control of Okinawa, but also to the presence of 
military bases in the rest of Japan in general.10 A similar outcry emerged when Prime 
Minister Kishi succeeded in re-negotiating the Security Treaty in 1960. Widespread 
public protests were staged and eventually succeeded in forcing Kishi’s resignation.11 
However, while the public protests and controversy over the bases in Okinawa have 
continued in wave after wave until the present day,12 the public record goes comparably 
silent when discussing protest and controversy in the other bases in Japan. The Okinawan 
people’s collective memory of the horrors of the “Typhoon of Steel” has decided the 
course and colored the perceptions of the bases on Okinawa since the end of the war and 
constitute the most persistent irritant in the U.S.–Japan Alliance.13 Andrew Yeo, in his 
2011 book, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests, dedicates two chapters to 
discussion of the anti-base movement in Okinawa, but does not even mention the 
                                                 
8. Google Search, accessed May 30, 2012, http://www.google.com. 
9. Yeo, Activists, 65. 
10. Cooley, Base Politics, 181. 
11. Ibid., 187. 
12. Yeo, Activists, 66–70. 
13. Ibid., 65–66. 
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remaining bases in Japan. Despite a continued, if slightly decreasing level of violent and 
other crimes committed by American service members and their dependents in Japan,14 it 
would appear that the protest and outcry against U.S bases is largely confined to 
Okinawa. While Andrew Yeo does not mention any protest outside of Okinawa 
whatsoever, even Alexander Cooley, who does discuss protests throughout Japan as a 
whole, cites no examples beyond the controversy surrounding the 1960 revised security 
treaty. In fact, he explicitly informs us that “after 1970, political mobilization against the 
U.S. basing presence was confined mostly to Okinawa, especially as the issue became 
embedded in the triangular politics of the Okinawa–Tokyo–Washington relationship.”15 
A notable exception to the academic silence regarding base related tensions 
outside of Okinawa is Kent Calder’s Embattled Garrisons. In his chapter entitled The 
Base Politics Environment, he elucidates his “contact hypothesis,” whereby the level of 
tension surrounding a particular installation is greatly affected by the population density 
of the host communities compared to the number of U.S. personnel stationed there. The 
more densely populated and the more military in the area, the more likely interaction or 
“contact” is to occur and consequently the higher the level of tension in a given area. He 
not only assigns both Kanagawa prefecture (the home of Yokosuka) and Okinawa a 
“high” for “level of tension” (“level of tension” is said to be based on “relative number of 
protests and incidents, but no citation is offered in support of his assertions), but asserts 
that “base relations are more delicate in Kanagawa prefecture near Tokyo, with a high 
population density of 3,639 per square kilometer, and major bases at Yokosuka and 
Yokota, than they are in Okinawa Prefecture, with three-fourths of total USFJ 
stations...”16 
Whether Calder means to say that tensions in Kanagawa are actually worse than 
in Okinawa or just more susceptible to potentially derailing incidents, his argument flies 
in the face of Tobias Harris’ assertion in the wake of the 2008 stabbing that “that the  
                                                 
14. Teri Weaver and Hana Kusumoto, “Major Crimes Among Military Down in Japan,” Stars and 
Stripes, February 10, 2008, accessed June 8, 2012, http://www.stripes.com/news/major-crimes-among-
military-down-in-japan-1.74689. 
15. Cooley, Base Politics, 191. 
16. Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 121–122. 
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situation in Yokosuka is calm: no protests, little hysteria among the local population, and 
complaints from business owners who fear that business will be hurt by the new 
restrictions.”17 
Calder bases his assertion that both Kanagawa and Okinawa share “high” levels 
of tension based on the “relative number of incidents and demonstrations.” At the same 
time, he tells us that Yamaguchi prefecture, host to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, 
enjoys a “low” level of tension.18 This is difficult to believe. A brief look at the websites 
of local newspapers, the Chugoku Shinbun and the slightly smaller circulation Yokosuka 
Keizai Shinbun tells a different story. Although this represents only a single snapshot of 
the reportage, on May 30, 2012, the top stories in Yokosuka Keizai about the Yokosuka 
base are a jazz festival, a rose festival, and the Spring Festa where the base is open to the 
Japanese public.19 In contrast, even where the Chugoku Shinbun is reporting on the Japan 
America Friendship Day, this is more to criticize the base for changing policy and 
requiring visitors to present an ID card upon entry. Other stories involve concerns about 
the move of planes from Atsugi to Iwakuni and the potential associated noise pollution, 
and the requests of residents for more money from the Defense Ministry for 
soundproofing their homes against the new jets.20 Even accounting for the possibility that 
the Chugoku is a more left-leaning newspaper than the Yokosuka Keizai, two local 
newspapers having such disparate coverage of their local bases indicates that there may 
be something wrong with Calder’s measurements. 
The available academic and policy literature on base politics in Japan indicates 
several things. First, there is controversy surrounding U.S. bases in Okinawa. That is 
                                                 
17. Harris, “Yokosuka.” 
18. Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 122. 
19. Yokosuka Keizai Shinbun Search Page, accessed May 30, 2012, 
http://yokosuka.keizai.biz/search.php. 









uncontroversial. Second, there is something short of consensus on the actual level of 
controversy in bases outside of Okinawa. Finally, there is a relative dearth of actual 
quantitative or qualitative assessment of the level of controversy in any of the bases 
beyond to say that controversy exists. The contribution my thesis can make to the body of 
knowledge is to provide a more clear understanding of the absolute level of tension at 
bases. 
This thesis consists of an analytical attempt to compare the real levels of 
controversy or tension at USFJ installations in Japan and an attempt to explain the 
differing levels of tension in four bases in Japan: Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, 
Yokosuka Naval Base, Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, and Kadena Air Force Base. 
The choice of these four installations should accomplish several goals at once. An 
in depth look at the available information on the frequency, scale, and nature of the anti-
base protests, and the nature of press coverage of a given base should be able provide a 
good idea of the real level of tension that is more detailed than Calder’s “high” or 
“low.”21 
Additionally, I examine the normally associated “causes” for base tension 
including petty and violent crime, incidents of drunk driving, and the potential for the 
presence of the base to turn the surrounding community into collateral damage in the 
event of a United States vs. third-party conflict. I investigated the presence or absence of 
these potentially exacerbating influences in an attempt to determine which actually have 
an effect on base tensions. Yokosuka is revealed to be less tense than, not just the bases 
in Okinawa, but other bases in the mainland of Japan that are sometimes assumed by 
casual observers, and asserted by Calder to be, less controversial overall.22 The data 
demonstrate not just that the problems of our bases in Japan are predominantly an 
Okinawa Mondai, but that Yokosuka in particular represents a positive model of base– 
community relations. This is something that both social scientists interested in base 
                                                 
21. Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 122. 
22. Ibid. 
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politics and policy makers will benefit from. Perhaps other facilities can learn from that 
success. 
The thesis begins with an introduction of the basic roots of the broader anti-base 
movement in Japan. This is followed by a more detailed discussion of the movement as it 
played out in Okinawa and as it has been widely reported in both academic and 
commercial outlets. 
This is followed by the case studies where I attempt to assess and rank the level of 
tension at each facility. Then, I discuss the question of causes. In my research, I 
examined major crimes and public safety incidents, base size, public nuisance like traffic 
and aviation noise, and how cosmopolitan a community surrounds the base. I also discuss 
the local political climate and look at how the political leanings of local politicians and 
press coverage influences the level of tension at each facility. I have determined that the 
well-publicized incidents of rape and murder, while certainly selling newspapers, have 
little influence on the tone of base–community relations. For one thing, all four case 
studies have had at least one major crime incident in the last ten years, yet there is 
significant variation in the level of tension across the case studies. What appears to matter 
more are the demographics and political leanings of the host community. The more 
cosmopolitan and the less influenced by radical politics a community is, the better a base 
will “get along” with its host community. Finally, I present my conclusions with regards 
to the qualitative analysis of the actual level of tension and then try to make policy 
recommendations based on my findings on the causal factors. 
 12 
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II. CASE STUDIES 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: AN ALLIANCE BORN OF 
CONTROVERSY 
Despite the nearly uncontested view that Japan is the United States’ most 
important partner in East Asia and that the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty is among if not the 
strongest and most vital alliances for the 21st century,23 it has not always been that way. 
Nor does it necessarily appear to be the case upon a casual examination. To begin with, 
the initial security treaty in 1951 was written while Japan was still an occupied nation and 
essentially negotiated at the end of a gun barrel, or, more precisely, amid the ashes of the 
double detonation of the only atomic attack in history. In this context, it is not difficult to 
imagine that many Japanese could have viewed the San Francisco Treaty as an unfair and 
unequal agreement forced upon them by the country that defeated the Imperial Military in 
the Pacific War.24 
As the Yoshida Doctrine, gradually at first, then more rapidly, led Japan out of the 
devastation of defeat into post-war economic prosperity, interest began to grow in the 
idea of revising the treaty in order to eliminate some of the perceived inequalities in the 
original document. The late 1950s were a time of great uncertainty, particularly in Japan. 
Additionally, despite the inequalities in the original treaty, there was a sense that Japan 
had aligned with the stronger of the two contenders in the emerging Cold War.25 
However, the aftermath of the Korean War, the construction of the Berlin Wall, the 
launch of Sputnik, and other developments gave elites as well as the “man on the street” 
pause as to whether they had actually picked a winner in the newly bi-polar world.26 
                                                 
23. Ted Osius, The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance: Why it Matters and How to Strengthen It (Westport: 
Praeger Publishers, 2002), xiii–xv. 
24. George R. Packard, III, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1966), 4–16. 
25. Ibid., 32. 
26. Ibid., 59. 
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As Prime Minister Kishi struggled to renegotiate the treaty, opposition erupted 
both from the communist and socialist left and the nationalist right.27 Popular protest 
grew until riots rocked Tokyo in 1960 culminating in the cancellation of President 
Eisenhower’s visit to Japan, Kishi’s resignation, and the biggest rift in U.S.–Japan 
relations since Pearl Harbor. The revised treaty was signed and ratified, but both 
American and Japanese politicians and security professionals were shaken by the 
violence of the protests and uncertainty characterized the relationship for years 
afterwards.28 
The case studies that follow are by no means meant to represent a comprehensive 
of base–community relations throughout the entire country of Japan, but rather to provide 
a small sample of some of the most important and analytically useful bases in an effort to 
assess whether or not there are significant differences in the level of tension or lack 
thereof across different installation in Japan. What follows is a first attempt to conduct a 
comparative study of base–community relations in Japan, a topic that is rarely if ever 
examined outside of Okinawa Prefecture and has never been subjected to any kind of 
empirical comparison. 
The cases selected were chosen based on the author’s familiarity with the 
installation and the strategic importance to American interests in the case of Naval 
Station Yokosuka and the relatively low level of controversy there. Marine Corps Air 
Station Futenma was chosen to contrast with this as it exhibits a high degree of notoriety 
(or perhaps infamy). Kadena Air Base was selected based on its co-location with 
Futenma on the main island of Okinawa and the fact that it is a large installation 
comparable in size and strategic significance to Yokosuka. Marine Corps Air Station 
Iwakuni was chosen because it is a smaller base, a Marine Corps Air Station like 
Futenma, but located outside of Okinawa in “mainland” Japan. 
While I initially anticipated a gradual degradation in the level of positive base–
community relations the closer the installation was to Okinawa, what I discovered is that 
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outside of isolated flare-ups pursuant to major incidents of violent crime, the bases on the 
mainland of Japan are hardly controversial at all. Iwakuni suffers slightly higher levels of 
controversy that Yokosuka, but I find that this is mainly because it is an air facility more 
than anything else. Additionally even though Kadena is one of the largest and busiest Air 
Bases in the world and located a mere eight miles from Futenma, the epicenter of the 
Okinawan anti-base movement, Kadena enjoys a significantly lower level of controversy 
and protest than Futenma. It turns out that the Marines on Okinawa, due to a variety of 
factors, bear the brunt of the anti-base animus not just from Okinawans but from Japan as 
a whole. 
In terms of causal factors for positive or negative base relations, I examine the 
presence or absence of high-profile violent crime incidents, traffic accidents and drunk 
driving, aviation noise, aviation accidents or other public safety issues, and general civil 
nuisance problems like crowding and traffic jams. On the positive side I discuss U.S.-
initiated community relations/outreach programs designed to help the community view 
the bases they host as assets rather than burdens. 
It is worth noting that while high-profile crime incidents are easy to point to as a 
reason for bases to be controversial, they are actually endogenous factors in this case. As 
illustrated below, all four bases have had high-profile criminal incidents, but there is 
significant variation in terms of the actual level of tension at these facilities and in the 
media treatment of these incidents. In short, the profile of these incidents is made “high” 
as a result of the controversy that surrounds a given base, not the other way around. 
Additionally, I discuss broader, more systemic causes on the host nation side, 
such as the presence or absence of a strong tradition of opposition to U.S. policy 
specifically or more general anti-militarism. I also examine the state of the local 
economy, the level of education of the local population, and the likelihood of the 
population’s exposure to (non-military) foreigners. I attempt to argue that more 
prosperous, better educated, and most cosmopolitan communities whose politics trend 
towards the center enjoy the best overall base relations. Conversely, I argue that 
communities where political extremism tends to surface frequently, communities that 
suffer from lack of economic development, chronic under-education, and a lack of 
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exposure to non-military foreigners tend to display the most negative aspects of base–
community relations. Some might argue that it is the bases themselves that tend to 
radicalize politics. However, if this were the case, then the bases in Yokosuka and 
Iwakuni should be expected to have the same radicalizing effect. Some amount of 
radicalization is caused by the bases themselves, of course, but host communities degree 





















Futenma 1 High High Yes <0.04 Weak High 
Kadena 0 Medium High Yes <0.04 Weak Medium High 
Iwakuni 0 Medium Medium No 0.8–1.2 Medium Medium Low 
Yokosuka 0 Low High No >1.6 Strong Low 
Table 1.   Levels of Base Controversy 
B. CASUAL FACTORS 
There are essentially four factors generated on the United States military side that 
serve to make base–community relations more controversial. Most obvious simply due to 
the publicity associated with their occurrence are the major violent crimes like the 
murders in Yokosuka or the sexual assaults in Okinawa. Second and largely related to the 
first are the issues addressed by Kent Calder in his Contact Hypothesis. Calder suggests 
that the more dense a surrounding population is, there is increased likelihood of 
interaction with base personnel. This interaction will inevitably cause an increase in 
base–community tension. However, Yokosuka is the largest of all four case studies and 
appears to contradict Calder’s assertions. Third is the actual occurrence or even fear of 
aviation mishaps as characterized by the 2004 helicopter crash at Okinawa International 
University campus. The fourth and final factor to take into account is simple civil 
nuisance issues like aviation noise and traffic problems associated with day to day base 
operations. 
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Surprisingly enough, the well-publicized criminal cases that a casual observer 
would point to as the prime mover in base controversy appears, on closer examination, to 
make very little difference in the level of controversy around any given base. Certainly 
the sexual assaults committed by Marines in Okinawa have generated a great deal of 
controversy all on their own, but, as discussed in the individual case studies that follow, 
these types of crimes have been reported and dealt with at all four of the case study bases. 
The main difference lies not in the number or frequency or severity of the crime in 
question, but rather in the degree to which those crimes have been successfully 
politicized by anti-base activists. 
Aviation safety and aviation noise are also a large and salient factors in 
accounting for the actual level of base controversy. The perception or characterization of 
MCAS Futenma as the “most dangerous airfield in the world” is a tremendous factor in 
making Futenma the most controversial of my four case studies. It is telling that most of 
the complaints and protests concerning Kadena and Iwakuni also center around aviation 
concerns. While the degree to which these concerns are rooted in reality is debatable, the 
fact that Yokosuka manages to avoid high levels of controversy (despite two very well 
publicized murders committed by Sailors in the last decade) indicates that the operation 
of aircraft, especially in populated areas, tends to generate controversy. This finding is 
not surprising. A look at the property values in the flight path for San Francisco 
International Airport in San Mateo compared to the surrounding areas tells the same story 
as those in Narita or Futenma. Jet noise is a public nuisance and a factor likely to produce 
controversy regardless of whether the aircraft tails are stamped Japan Airlines (JAL), 
USMC (United States Marine Corps), or United Airlines.29 
As for factors of petty crime, traffic and other related issues, these are factors that 
are shared across all four facilities in this study. Since there is little reported difference in 
the tendency of one facility or another to produce these minor events, but a clear 
difference in the level of controversy between facilities, it is apparent that this is not a 
significant contributing factor in determining the overall tone of base–community 
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International Position Brief, 2010. 
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relations. While it certainly does not make the relationship any better, as a common 
feature of bases throughout the county (and likely throughout military facilities world-
wide), it cannot be pointed to as a major factor in increasing controversy at a given 
facility. 
On the Japanese side of the equation are more complicated issues. Of primary 
importance are political and historical factors. These are key especially in explaining the 
much more acrimonious base community relationships on Okinawa but they play a role 
in what controversy exists for the other facilities as well. But social, demographic, and 
economic factors also appear to have at least a correlative, if not explicitly causal 
relationship. 
Given the drastic differences in the level of controversy between MCAS Futenma 
and everywhere else (even Kadena), it appears that the most important factors in 
determining the tenor of base–community relations lie in the political environment and 
the public perception of the mission of a given facility. Okinawa has a long history of 
being “Resistant Islands.”30 The Okinawan anti-base activists draw their power from the 
Okinawan people’s collective memory of the horrors of the Pacific War.31 Also, while 
there are certainly sincere pacifists on the islands, there is a group of activists and 
politicians who have grown extremely adept at using the American military presence as 
leverage in order to extract concessions from the Central government in Tokyo.32 Any 
incidents that do occur are well publicized by the Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo 
with an eye to putting the Americans in the worst possible light and used to great effect 
by local politicians.33 
Social and demographic factors also contribute significantly in determining the 
positive or negative perception of a base in a given community. On the whole, the 
stronger the local economy and the greater the ratio of the non-military foreign 
                                                 
30. Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and 
the United States (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 9–10. 
31. Ibid., 18–22. 
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33. Major Christopher Anderson, e-mail message to author, October 20, 2012. 
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population, the more likely a base will have a positive relationship with its host 
community. Finally, the presence of a corresponding Japanese Self Defense Force in or 
around the local area of a U.S. base tends to greatly mollify any tension that might exist 
around the American facility. This is less true in Okinawa where, while there is a JSDF 
presence, Okinawans tend to view the Japanese military with at least equal rancor and 
animosity. 
1. Major Crimes 
Over the past quarter century, a number of violent crimes, perpetrated by 
American service members stationed at bases in Japan have received huge amounts of 
publicity and been credited at times with endangering the very foundations of the U.S.–
Japan Security Treaty. All four cases have been involved in at least one major crime story 
in the last 25 years. 
Again, the most publicized events occurred in Okinawa involving the Marines 
stationed there. Futenma has borne the brunt of the controversy surrounding these events 
regardless of whether the perpetrators in these cases were assigned to Futenma directly or 
not. The 1995 rape case was the springboard for the latest wave of anti-base activism in 
Okinawa that has yet to subsist.34 Since that time, a number of recurring sexual assaults 
by Okinawa based Marines have made headlines in 2002, 2003, and 2008. Most recently 
in October of 2012 allegations of rape by two Sailors visiting Okinawa on temporary duty 
and the November 2012 assault charge leveled against an Air Force Airman from Kadena 
have re-energized the anti-base movement and led to larger pushes to close Futenma. 
In 2005 and 2008, there were two widely reported murders committed by U.S. 
Navy Sailors. In 2005, a Sailor on Unauthorized Absence (UA) status robbed and beat an 
elderly woman to death near the base entrance in Yokosuka. Then in 2008, another sailor 
stabbed a taxi cab driver to death in an altercation over a fare. While further study might 
point to a significant difference between the Yokosuka murders and the sexual nature of 
the crimes in Okinawa, it is striking that the two murders have not had a dramatically 
negative impact on the facility’s relationship with the community. Certainly on the 
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whole, zero murders is preferable to two murders and any murders are certain to make the 
relationship more problematic than not. However, these crimes have not been able to 
permanently damage the relationship between Yokosuka city and the base. 
Iwakuni and Kadena tell a similar story. In 2001 and 2005 Airmen assigned to 
Kadena were charged with sexual assaults and in Iwakuni sexual assault cases made 
headlines in 2004 and 2008. However, in these two cases as well, while they certainly 
provide ammunition to the pacifist left in general, the crimes have fallen short of 
galvanizing a strong popular effort to close these particular installations. 
The unfortunate fact that these kinds of major crimes are a common feature to all 
four case study bases is surely something to be lamented. However, the outcome in terms 
of base controversy indicates that the media treatment and the public reaction to these 
crimes are the deciding factor in determining whether a given base will be controversial 
or not rather than the occurrence of the crimes themselves. Even if these crimes do have 
an impact in isolation, in all cases, they’re trumped by the other factors that follow. 
2. Aviation Safety 
Concern about aviation safety and aviation noise more generally does seem to 
explain a portion of the differences in the level of controversy surrounding the four case 
studies. It does not, however, appear to be the deciding factor. While all three of the air 
facilities are subject to a higher degree of public outcry than Yokosuka is, there remains a 
large gap between the attention paid to Futenma and that received by Kadena and 
Iwakuni. 
Interviews with Public Affairs officials from the Kadena and Iwakuni indicate 
that the majority of official and popular protests center around concerns of aircraft noise 
and overflight/safety concerns. The recent development and deployment of the V-22 
Osprey have provided anti-base activists with another salient talking point to generate 
public discussion.35 However, there have been no major publicly documented aviation 
accidents associated with these two bases in the past decade. Noise complaints are a 
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common feature of airports around the world and not in any way unique to U.S. military 
airbases in Japan. The Naval Station at Yokosuka has had no complaints in relation to its 
helicopter pad. 
Futenma on the other hand, had a major aviation mishap in 2004 when a Marine 
Corps CH-53 helicopter crashed into the main administration building of Okinawa 
University. While there were no fatalities, and the only injuries were sustained by the air 
crew, the outcome could obviously have been much worse.36 Additionally, the organized 
resistance to the base’s presence has successfully lobbied the Tokyo government to 
provide sound proofing for houses that neighbor the flight line and the Osprey 
deployment has provided significant traction for anti-base activist forces in generating 
local public outcry as opposed to the resistance in Iwakuni where organizers are forced to 
bus in protesters from throughout the country. 
The reason that aviation issues at Futenma generate so much more controversy 
than Iwakuni or even neighboring Kadena has little to do with the nature of the aviation 
noise itself, but the salience that any issue dealing with Futenma tends to have in the 
public discourse. In other words, Futenma is not controversial because of aviation issues, 
rather, aviation issues at Futenma are controversial because the base as a whole is 
described in the media as a “problem.” 
3. Civil Nuisance 
With the exception of aircraft noise, other civil nuisance issues like traffic and 
petty crime are shared across all four case studies and probably exert no significant 
influence on public perception of a base’s presence in any of the four communities.37 The 
possible exception to this is in Futenma where, due to the dispersed nature of the other 
Marine Corps commands across the island, frequent convoys create more frequent and 
visible problems for the local populace. This is regarded as a nuisance by a significant 
portion of the population. 
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4. Historical Anti-Militarism 
Historical anti-militarism is by far the most significant factor in determining 
which bases suffer from the most controversy. While in the immediate post-war period 
and then particularly during the renegotiation of the Security Treaty in 1959–1960, anti-
militarism reached a national peak,38 nation-wide opposition to the U.S. military 
presence in Japan has been steadily waning. Okinawa prefecture is the sole exception to 
this broad trend. 
Yokosuka has continuously hosted a naval base since the early Meiji Era. Iwakuni 
is located in Yamaguchi Prefecture, formerly part of Choshu, the home of many of the 
Meiji founders like Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo.39 Anti-militarism has never 
really taken root in either of these communities. 
Okinawa on the other hand has no history of a strong support for any military 
presence. The anti-military sentiment there is not limited to an animosity towards 
American militarism, but Japanese militarism as well. Annexed by Tokyo in the Meiji 
Era and then victimized by both sides in the Battle of Okinawa, anti-base activists benefit 
from deep roots and still fresh memories of the horrors of war and military occupation.40 
At present, the most influential factor on the level of controversy surrounding 
bases in Okinawa is the entrenched nature of leftist and pacifist activists within the 
community. When the Ryukyu Shimpo has a banner link on its homepage leading to 
discussion of the Battle of Okinawa (which ended more than 60 years ago), it becomes 
apparent that anti-base sentiment runs deeper than the United States Marine Corps, the V-
22 Osprey, or the handful of sexual assault cases reported since 1995. 
5. Social, Economic, and Demographic Factors 
The final set of factors that influences the outcome of base controversy, or is at 
least related to the dependent variable in this case is the state of the economy, level of 
                                                 
38. Packard, Protest, 3. 
39. Ibid., 48. 
40. McCormack and Norimatsu, Resistant Islands, 29–30. 
 23 
education, and the number of non-military foreigners residing around these bases. It 
appears that bases in which the host communities have strong economies and a skilled 
and educated workforce tend to enjoy a better relationship with that community than 
bases located in communities where the economy is struggling. Communities that have a 
higher percentage of non-military foreigners tend to have less of a problem with the 
presence of their base. 
I used a number of different measures available on the Japanese Statistics 
Bureau’s website to assess the strength of the host communities’ economies. The first is 
the number of businesses operating per square kilometer. As part of the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area, Yokosuka City has the most: between 100 and 500 establishments  
per square kilometer. Yamaguchi and Okinawa Prefectures have prefectural averages of 
10–25 and 25–50 businesses per square kilometer, respectively; however Okinawa’s 
population density dwarfs that of Yamaguchi’s. In 2010, Okinawa’s population density 
was double that of Yamaguchi’s.41 Employment figures tell the same story with 
Kanagawa well ahead and Yamaguchi and Okinawa fairly even when one corrects for 
overall population density.42 
Looking at the makeup of the labor force, one sees a more telling trend. While 
Kanagawa prefecture has a large contingent of managers and executives and Yamaguchi 
boasts a high number of skilled laborers and workers, Okinawa’s employment is 
overwhelmingly centered on lower paying service related jobs. The average income of 
these three prefectures is the most telling. While Okinawans bring home less than half 
what the denizens of Kanagawa do, Yamaguchi’s average income is nearly as high as 
Kanagawa’s. The populations of Yokosuka and Iwakuni’s host community enjoy a clear 
economic advantage over that of Futenma and Kadena’s hosts.43 
                                                 
41. Japan Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards) & Statistical 





The number of non-military foreigners living in the area around the bases also 
illustrates an important difference in the community dynamic for these four facilities. 
Exposure of the native population to a broad cross section of non-military foreigners can 
change people’s perception of the military presence as well. If a Japanese citizen knows 
foreigners who work in their office or teach their children in school, the idea of the 
military presence as just a burden on the community is likely to be diminished. Not 
surprisingly, Okinawa has the lowest ratio of non-military foreign population while 
Yamaguchi boasts considerably more and Kanazawa has even more than that.44 
While some of these factors are certainly related to each other and difficult to 
disentangle, the evidence indicates that while major crimes and civil nuisance issues are 
common to all four bases, political, demographic, and economic factors are what makes 
the difference in the level of controversy these bases confront on a daily basis. Questions 
remain as to the ultimate root cause. For example, I have argued that a political 
predisposition for anti-militarism and leftist tendencies make for a controversial base. At 
the same time, I have argued that successful economy and a more diverse public make 
bases less controversial. However, it is clear that the leftist politics tend to show up in 
places like Okinawa where the economy is struggling. It is also likely that it is the strong 
economy in Kanagawa and Yamaguchi that draws the non-military foreign population to 
settle there. Is the leftist/pacifist bend of politics simply an intervening variable along 
with non-military foreign residence rates? Or are the political leanings of Okinawans 
more drawn from history than modern economy? These are questions for further study. 
C. OKINAWA: A HISTORY OF DOUBLE COLONIZATION 
American military basing in Okinawa has been a perennial source of controversy 
since the end of the war as well.45 Okinawa Prefecture’s unique status and history first as 
an independent kingdom annexed by Meiji Japan, the site or the Pacific War’s most 
ferocious battle,46 and the last piece of Japanese territory to be restored to Japanese 
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sovereignty in 1972 (spending an additional 20 years under American military 
occupation) makes it doubly ripe to be a hotbed of anti-base activism.47 Many 
Okinawans today view their islands as essentially suffering a double layered colonization, 
first by mainland Japan through the Tokyo government and then by the more than 50,000 
U.S. military personnel stationed there on 14 separate installations.48 
The specter of the Battle of Okinawa is an especially important factor in the 
controversy surrounding the alliance in Okinawa and the acrimonious state of base 
community relations throughout the prefecture.49 In addition to the savage fighting 
between U.S. Marines and the Imperial Army resulting in heavy American casualties and 
the complete decimation of the Japanese garrison, the civilian population of Okinawa was 
devastated before, during, and after the battle, suffering brutality at the hands of the 
Japanese defenders and the conquering Americans.50 
The end of the war and the reversion of Japanese sovereignty in 1952 did little to 
alleviate the suffering of the Okinawan people, who continued to bear the burden of 
American occupation for an additional 20 years. That 20 year period was marked by 
periodic protests against the seizure of private lands for base construction that, while 
falling short of an all-inclusive and unified movement, set the stage for the future that 
U.S. military personnel now confront on a daily basis.51 
While there was some initial support for reversion to Japanese sovereignty in 
1972 among Okinawans, the realization that that reversion was unlikely to reduce 
American military presence on the islands or in any way alleviate the Okinawan share of 
the Japanese defense burden led to a rapid evaporation of that support. Strong pacifist 
sentiment, rooted in the Okinawan memory and experience of the Battle of Okinawa 
developed into the current pattern of resistance against both the national government in 
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Tokyo and the American military presence as well as the overseas missions the Air Force 
and particularly the Marine Corps engage in.52 
Since the end of the Pacific War, Okinawans have endured a number of hardships 
as a result of the American military presence on the islands. From increased traffic to 
loud servicemen carousing the town to aircraft noise to accidents to horrific crimes 
perpetrated by service members, Okinawa has borne the bulk of the Japanese defense 
burden in terms of quartering and dealing with the United States military.  
The current pattern that has emerged is for Okinawan activists, aligned with left-
wing, anti-base, anti-military journalists, and local politicians, to use the base controversy 
as leverage to extract concessions from the central government.53 This, combined with a 
growing tendency for the mainland Japanese electorate to sympathize or experience guilt 
over the perception that Okinawans have had to shoulder an unfair portion of the burden 
for Japan’s defense, has led to an increasingly uncomfortable position for U.S. military 
bases in the prefecture.54 Extraordinary media scrutiny has also served to exacerbate an 
already tricky diplomatic and security problem for U.S. military planners, diplomats, and 
the Tokyo government.55 
D. MCAS FUTENMA: CONTROVERSY EMBODIED 
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma is a familiar name to anyone even slightly 
conversant with U.S.–Japan relations, Japanese politics, base politics, or U.S. foreign 
policy in Asia. It receives honorable mention in Nemesis, Chalmers Johnson’s 2007 book 
subtitled the last days of the American Republic.56 How is it that a base which houses 
only 400057 of the approximately 50,000 U.S. troops in Okinawa can be the source of 
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such controversy and even be considered a significant factor in the downfall of the 
American Republic by a serious scholar like Johnson? 
As previously discussed, Okinawa has been the center of anti-base activism in 
Japan since the conclusion of the revised security treaty in 1960. Nationwide protests 
subsided after the rioting in Tokyo came to an end and President Eisenhower canceled his 
visit with Prime Minister Kishi58 but the Okinawan resistance to U.S. presence 
remained.59 In a way it resembled a volcanic nature of the islands themselves. At times 
the magma simply boiled away beneath the surface, but frequently erupted in well 
reported, well publicized, and extremely politicized flashes. 
1. Timeline of Flashpoints 
Throughout this period, Futenma itself was simply one of the many American 
bases that Okinawan activists and politicians wanted to relocate out of the prefecture or 
extract concessions from the American or Japanese government because of. Many 
incidents caused tension in Okinawa over the period between 1960 and the present. 
However, it was the 1995 abduction and rape of a 12-year-old school girl by a group of 
Marines that re-galvanized the Okinawan resistance movement and set events on the 
trajectory that put Marine Corps Air Station Futenma at the top of the Okinawan public 
enemy list.60 That event was followed by a helicopter crash on a university campus that 
merely through blind luck resulted in no fatalities.61 
Following the aviation accident, activists began to call Futenma “the most 
dangerous airfield in the world” citing both the aging fleet of helicopters and Futenma’s 
location right in downtown Ginowan city, a municipality with a population of nearly 
100,000 people. According to Chalmers Johnson, even Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld remarked with wonder that there had not yet been a fatal accident.62 
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The controversy simmered on for the next 14 years with various solutions offered 
to resolve the problems surrounding the base both from the Liberal Democratic Party 
government and the American leadership. However, little progress was made towards 
enacting any of those plans. 
Then, in 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan, led by future Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama campaigned successfully to wrest control of the government from the Liberal 
Democratic Party, which had held control of the Diet almost uninterrupted since 1952. 
Their success was based on a platform, one plank of which was a revision of an 
agreement between the United States and Japan to relocate 9,000 Marines currently based 
in Okinawa to Guam in exchange for building a new replacement facility for Futenma, 
this time in the far north of Okinawa in a town called Henoko.63 
This campaign promise, and his inability to deliver on it, was a partial cause for 
Hatoyama’s extremely short tenure as Prime Minister. The other result was that it served 
to re-energize the movement to close Futenma permanently and move the base out of 
Okinawa Prefecture and, if possible, out of the country altogether. Suddenly, the fait 
accomplis of the replacement base in Henoko was called into question and Marine Corps 
Air Station Futenma essentially became the embodiment and symbol of the entire anti-
base movement. 
Even more recently, the decision to go ahead with phased replacement of the 
aging fleet of CH-46 helicopters stationed at Futenma with tilt-rotor V-22 Ospreys has 
also proven controversial and met with fierce opposition. According to a Japanese 
reporter who is well versed in defense issues, even people in mainland Japan who are 
generally supportive of the alliance and U.S. bases have been questioning the timing of 
the deployment of the Osprey to Futenma when tensions already seem to be at an all-time 
high.64 
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2. General Level of Controversy 
Of the four case studies I will examine in this thesis, Futenma is, by an 
overwhelming margin, the most controversial and suffers the most strident criticism of 
all. It is unquestionably the most controversial base in Japan, possibly the most 
controversial U.S. base worldwide. While Futenma is the current focal point of Okinawan 
and Japan-wide anti-base activism, it is in fact the entire Marine Corps presence in 
Okinawa that suffers from an image problem.65 While the majority of the mass 
demonstrations have centered around the current air station in Ginowan with protesters 
going so far as to fly kites in a deliberate effort to thwart and endanger flight operations, 
particularly of the new Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft,66 as well as a constant presence of 
protesters at the site of the proposed replacement facility in Henoko, it is the Marine 
Corps as a whole that is the most reviled presence in Okinawa.67 
Futenma is only a small fraction of the Marine presence on the island and, 
according to Dr. Robert Eldridge the animosity that is currently manifest as a protest 
against Futenma is more accurately described as being caused by the animosity towards 
the Okinawan Marines as a whole. He asserts that this stems from a variety of factors. 
First, and most importantly in his estimation, there is an overall lack of understanding of 
the purpose of the Marine Corps. The Japanese people, he says, “can understand a Navy, 
they can understand and Army and Air Force” since modern Japan has the equivalent of 
these forces in the modern day Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in the Japanese 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force 
(JGSDF), and the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). However, owing to Japans 
post war pacifist constitution, the expeditionary nature of the United States Marine Corps 
is a truly foreign concept.68 The fact that Japan has deliberately not developed 
expeditionary military capabilities since 1945 leads to questions about the need for 
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Marines to be stationed in Japan. This is especially so when one considers that, since 
2001, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan 
on multiple occasions, two missions that, even indirectly, seem to have very little to do 
with the defense of Japan. In fact, according to many activists, this only serves to increase 
the likelihood that Japan will become the target of terrorist attacks and international 
criticism. 
Dr. Eldridge also reports that the nature of the Marine Corps mission and the 
training that it necessitates involves what he calls “the three ‘K’s,’ kiken (危険), kitsui 
(緊い), kitanai (汚い), dangerous, harsh, and dirty.” According to Dr. Eldridge, because 
the JSDF has only rarely deployed in its more than 50-year history, the average Japanese 
citizen has difficulty understanding the rationale behind such training making the 
Marines even more of an enigma.69 
Additionally, of the more than 60,000 U.S. military personnel based in Okinawa, 
more than two thirds are Marines.70 Their presence dwarfs the size of the Air Force 
garrison at Kadena which the Department of Defense reports at just under 7,000, only a 
little more than a tenth of the total active duty population. If there is any truth at all to the 
Contact Hypothesis advanced by Kent Calder in his book Embattled Garrisons,71 the 
sheer number of Marines present on Okinawa at a given time means that overwhelmingly 
if Okinawans have contact with American service members, it will be with Marines and, 
consequently any negative interaction will also be with Marines. Any crimes reported 
will, simply due to statistical likelihood, be committed by Marines as well. 
Exacerbating this problem of sheer numbers, Marine Corps facilities are spread 
across the island in discrete but mutually dependent facilities. This requires a lot of transit 
which results in, at a minimum, greatly increased visibility in the community. The 
visibility is not just Marines in civilian clothes patronizing local businesses, but convoys 
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of military vehicles and high-tempo training and transport flights over populated areas. 
Inevitably this level and volume of transit causes traffic jams, accidents, and, in the case 
of aviation, noise pollution.72 
3. Contributing Factors 
All of these factors combine to place the Marines on Okinawa squarely in the 
bull’s eye of the anti-base movement. Kent Calder asserts that “‘Base–community 
conflict is a function of how frequently and intensely base inhabitants and the general 
community interact.’ Such interaction, which tends to generate civil-military conflict, is 
in turn postulated to be a function of population density in the areas where bases are 
located.”73 With the Marines, this is almost surely a factor. More than 50,000 Marines on 
a small island that is already densely populated certainly leads to friction. Despite the fact 
that MCAS Futenma represents only a small fraction of that 50,000, the political reality is 
that Futenma has become the focal point for the anger towards the Marine presence in 
general and the perceived deleterious influence of American military basing in general.74 
Additionally, in Futenma, especially if one accepts the proposition that Futenma 
is being used as the effigy of the entire Okinawan Marine contingent, one finds every 
possible negative factor influencing base–community relations. Near round-the-clock 
flight operations, increasing lately with work-ups for the Osprey deployment, a history of 
near misses with aviation accidents,75 safety concerns about the new Ospreys, a long 
series of horrible violent crimes and sexual assaults, and a dispersed infrastructure that 
causes traffic jams and accidents.76  
Add to this the fact that Okinawa’s economy is the least developed and most 
depressed in the country. It is Japan’s poorest and least educated prefecture. It also has 
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one of the smallest populations of non-military foreigners.77 Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, Okinawa’s long anti-militarist, anti-Tokyo, and anti-base tradition, rooted in 
leftist pacifist reaction to the horrific end of the Pacific War complete the picture.78 It 
would be difficult to imagine positive base–community relations in that situation. 
However frustrating, it is not an entirely negative story. In fact, of all four case 
studies, the Marines in Okinawa are making the biggest community outreach effort. 
Arguably, this is simply a function of the magnitude of the challenge they are facing, but 
this should not in any way diminish the outstanding efforts being made by the Marine 
Corps in Okinawa. In addition to “standard issue” military chaplain Community 
Relations (COMREL) activities like painting orphanages and volunteering at local 
schools or homeless shelters, the Government and External Affairs Office has created 
exchange opportunities with local trade schools and developed groundbreaking internship 
programs for Japanese medical professionals to gain experience working with wounded 
Marines in trauma centers in Okinawa and for Japanese youth to gain administrative, 
leadership, and diplomatic experience at Marine Corps Headquarters in Okinawa.79 
Unfortunately, so acrimonious is the local atmosphere regarding the bases that 
Okinawan doctors have yet to take advantage of the medical internship despite broad 
participation from mainland doctors. As for the youth Headquarters internship, the only 
nominally Okinawan participant was the son of a Marine Base commander stationed in 
Okinawa. In fact, none of these efforts has been published by either the Ryukyu Shimpo 
or the Okinawa Times and local universities and government officials refuse to endorse 
the programs publicly.80 
The Marines in Okinawa have had much better luck partnering with host nation 
entities outside of Okinawa. In particular, after their efforts after the March 2011 Tohoku 
Earthquake, a strong bond has been formed with the community of Oshima who 
benefited from the Marine Corps relief efforts. An additional partnership has been formed 
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with Shizuoka Prefecture in a joint disaster preparedness initiative that involves annual 
joint training.81 These efforts have boosted the Marine image in Japan more broadly, but 
base–community relations in Okinawa remain at an all-time low, made even worse by 
new allegations of another rape on Oct 16, 2012 (it is worth noting that the allegations 
have been made against two U.S. Navy Petty Officers not even stationed in Okinawa. 
Apparently they were simply air crew on a stopover from Texas. Yet again, the Marines 
find themselves the whipping boy in the Okinawan controversy).82 
E. YOKOSUKA: CONTRAST WITH FUTENMA 
The naval base at Yokosuka provides a stark contrast to the tense base–
community relations surrounding MCAS Futenma. In the academic literature on issues of 
American base politics around the world, Yokosuka barely receives mention at all. 
Alexander Cooley in Base Politics discusses Yokosuka in some detail. However, his 
research indicates that, even in response to some rather provocative incidents, there was a 
distinct lack of public outcry or popular protest.83 In fact, there is very little, if any kind 
of prolonged popular resistance to the U.S. Navy’s presence in Tokyo Bay. Kent Calder 
is a notable exception in that he asserts that both Kanagawa Prefecture and Okinawa 
Prefecture share a “level of tension” that he rates as “high.” However, as noted in the 
introduction to this thesis, he provides no evidence or explanation beyond this 
assertion.84 
In terms of size and strategic significance, Yokosuka is also a contrast to 
Futenma. While Futenma itself only houses around 4000 Marines, Yokosuka is home to 
approximately 2500 sailors assigned to the base itself as well as more than 10,000 
assigned to ships that are permanently forward deployed there.85 Strategically, Yokosuka 
is the backbone of the United States’ regional maritime posture and its significance 
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cannot be overstated. Futenma on the other hand, at least in the eyes of some analysts, is 
a bit of a wash creating very little bang for a lot of political bucks.86 
This is not to say that the base at Yokosuka has been completely unproblematic. 
Certainly, in the tumult of the 1960 riots, Yokosuka was a target of popular ire over the 
Security Treaty. Over the years, a number of well-publicized incidents have made 
headlines and prompted a certain degree of public outcry. I argue, however, that the 
popular protests against Yokosuka in no way even come close to the level found 
surrounding Futenma today. 
1. Timeline of Flashpoints 
The two relatively recent and well-publicized incidents involving personnel 
assigned to Yokosuka were the assault and beating death of a 53-year-old woman by an 
Airman assigned to USS Kitty Hawk in 2005, and the robbery and stabbing death of a 
taxi cab driver by a Seaman assigned to USS Cowpens in 2008. While there was 
significant media attention paid to both these events, as Cooley points out, “the most 
instructive aspect of this latest criminal jurisdiction case is how relatively little uproar it 
caused in Japan. Contrary to some claims that the murder might unleash a new wave of 
anti-U.S. Base sentiment and negatively affect ongoing realignment negotiations, the 
orderly resolution of the matter seemed to draw significant contrast, not comparisons, 
between the politics of U.S. base-related crimes in mainland Japan and in the more 
volatile setting of Okinawa.”87 
Another hot issue was the decision to replace USS Kitty Hawk, a conventionally 
powered aircraft carrier with USS George Washington, a ship that is powered by two 
nuclear reactors. Japan, understandably given the way the Pacific War ended, has a 
“nuclear allergy,” and it was widely regarded as a controversial move by the United 
States to deploy a nuclear-powered ship to Japan. Chalmers Johnson asserts that around 
this time, “powerful grassroots protests” were “unleashed” in Okinawa and Kanagawa 
Prefecture (home of Yokosuka Naval Base), which he takes care to inform the reader 
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includes former Prime Minister Koizumi’s electoral district. Unfortunately, he provides 
no citation for his claim of these “powerful grassroots protests” in Kanagawa.88 Perhaps 
there were protests in 2007 at the time his book was published, but even in the aftermath 
of the nuclear disaster at Fukushima, in 2012, aside from a very small group of anti-
nuclear activists, the presence of USS George Washington pier side in Yokosuka harbor 
is largely uncontroversial.89 
2. General Level of Controversy 
Aside from the media outcry surrounding particularly shocking crimes like the 
two described above, the level of popular opposition to U.S. basing in Yokosuka is 
negligible. There is, according to an interview with a Yokosuka based defense reporter, a 
vocal minority that organizes the occasional demonstration. However, in contrast to the 
vocal minority behind much of the negativity in Okinawa, this minority in Yokosuka is 
much less vocal and much more minor and they get very little in the way of support from 
the media, academic circles, or public officials.90 
In late 2012, a relatively large event was organized by left-wing anti-war activists 
in the neighborhood outside the Yokosuka base gate. However, unable to deliver real 
numbers to an actual anti-base demonstration, they settled for a “Peace Festival.” It was a 
family friendly event where pop singers performed on a small stage in an effort to 
promote peace. There was an information booth displaying information about the 
deployment of the Osprey to Okinawa and some of the reported safety concerns as well 
as information on George Washington’s propulsion plant. There were also a lot of food 
vendors and other festival games. In other words, it was more like a typical Japanese 
seasonal festival, simply organized and put on by a group with left-leaning politics.91 
This is a far cry from a “powerful grassroots movement” and certainly not anything to 
compare to the level of protest and demonstration in Okinawa. According to the same 
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Japanese reporter, “Yokosuka City has no military allergy.” In other words, the U.S. 
military presence in Yokosuka is uncontroversial and base–community relations are 
good.92 
3. Possible Contributing Factors 
Yokosuka shares many of the possible controversy-inducing factors found in 
Futenma specifically and with the Marine garrison of Okinawa more generally. The 
number of personnel assigned to the base itself is comparable to the size of the Futenma 
garrison and, when one factors in the number of Sailors assigned to the ships home ported 
there, the base population is at least in the same order of magnitude as the total Marine 
presence in Okinawa.93 As part of the sprawling Tokyo metropolitan area the 
surrounding community is even more densely populated than Okinawa. However, a 
possible advantage is that the Yokosuka base, in contrast to the dispersed nature of the 
Marine Camps that cover a huge area of the main island of Okinawa, is concentrated in 
one facility that covers a tiny fraction of the city seaside. 
The concentrated nature of the base itself alleviates the need for military vehicles 
and convoys transiting the city streets. As for aviation, there is only one infrequently 
utilized helipad on base so aircraft noise is negligible and any additional noise pollution 
is likely to be drowned out by the thousands of aircraft that pass overhead to either of the 
nearby international airports at Haneda and Narita. Naval Air Station Atsugi is hosted by 
Kanagawa Prefecture as well, but a close look at issues there is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Additionally, the impending transfer of the air wing to Marine Corps Air Station 
Iwakuni in southern Japan will serve to alleviate any concerns about this issue anyway.94 
Yokosuka has had its share of public relations nightmares. Already cited were the 
two well-reported murders. Also a rape of an Australian national was well reported in the 
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foreign press but appears to have been largely ignored by the Japanese public.95 As 
Alexander Cooley states, even the most horrendous crimes committed by U.S. service 
members tend not to develop the kind of anti-base traction found in Okinawa.96 Overall, 
the number and scale of protests and demonstrations in Yokosuka, even in response to 
potentially alliance damaging incidents, pales in comparison to those found in opposition 
to Futenma. 
The local economy and demographics of Yokosuka could contribute to a more 
amicable level of base–community relations. Kanagawa Prefecture ranks number three in 
household savings rates while Okinawa is number 47 (dead last). Overall, Kanagawa 
residents are better educated, better compensated, and more likely to be employed in 
management or technical fields than their countrymen in Okinawa.97 Additionally, the 
number of non-military foreigners residing in and around Yokosuka is also exponentially 
larger than the number of non-DoD (Department of Defense) civilians in Okinawa 
Prefecture.98 If a Japanese national has an interaction with a foreigner around Yokosuka, 
it is still most likely going to be a Navy Sailor, but if he/she has two interactions the 
second one might well be with a Briton working for a bank or an English teacher 
employed in a local school. Also worth noting, in either of the two case studies already 
discussed, or the two to follow, the odds that any interaction between a Japanese national 
and a U.S. military member will end in robbery, rape, or murder is absolutely minuscule. 
Politically, Kanagawa Prefecture tends to be centrist to conservative. Chalmers 
Johnson acknowledges that it is Liberal Democratic Party territory and home to former 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Yasukuni Shrine visit fame.99 Historically, centrist 
and conservatives that fall short of the Ishihara Shintaro version of nationalism tend to be 
supportive of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the American military presence. 
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Yokosuka is not just blessed by fortunate circumstances. Public affairs initiatives 
are a contributing factor. Open base days are frequent and popular events where the 
public is invited to visit the base and tour selected ships. Additionally, the same kinds of 
chaplain-initiated COMREL activities are a regular feature in the community.100 
However, these efforts in no way approach the level of sophistication of the efforts being 
made by the Marine Corps in Okinawa. 
F. KADENA 
Kadena is a useful case study in that it shares many of the attributes of both 
Yokosuka and Futenma. In terms of size and strategic significance as a single facility, 
Kadena is Yokosuka’s Air Force counterpart in Japan. Kadena is a key American airbase 
for power projection in the Pacific and a hub of activity for many strategic contingencies 
in the same way that Yokosuka is. 
The fact that Kadena is also an Okinawan air facility is the obvious comparison to 
Futenma. However, Kadena does not receive nearly the level of media attention or the 
concentrated effort of the anti-base protesters that Futenma is subject to. Why is it that 
Kadena is not more known outside defense circles? Why do the Marines get so much 
attention despite the fact that Kadena is a much bigger facility than Futenma? 
The fact is that despite its collocation in Okinawa, Kadena enjoys a much more 
constructive relationship with its host city. There are occasional formal complaints 
lodged over aviation noise, but these are largely understood to be posturing for the local 
papers and an attempt to make political hay with constituents. Behind closed doors 
however, relations are reported to be at least cordial if not friendly.101 
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1. Timeline of Flashpoints 
In 2001, a Kadena Airman was convicted of rape by an Okinawan court. This 
incident served to further inflame anti-base sentiment in Okinawa as a whole.102 
Additionally, Kadena tends to be the recipient of a certain level of collateral animosity 
any time there is a crime committed by any U.S. service member on the islands.103 
Additionally, while the safety record in recent years has been very good, there have been 
fatal accidents and crashes in past decades that are still tracked and reported in the 
Okinawa Times.104 Overall, while certainly implicated in any incident that occurs within 
the Prefecture, Kadena itself has not instigated any crime or accident in the past ten 
years. 
2. General Level of Controversy 
In stark contrast to the acrimony surrounding Marine Corps installations in 
general and MCAS Futenma in particular, Kadena appears to enjoy a largely positive 
relationship with its host community. Not only does the Air Force appear to have 
managed to at least avoid becoming the focus of the anti-base activism in Okinawa, it has 
also put forth community engagement efforts that are comparable to the work being done 
by their Marine Corps neighbors. These efforts combined with their “head start” in terms 
of not being the main target of base opposition politics create a relatively benign 
environment in terms of controversy and there seems to be considerable success in 
convincing the surrounding community to view the base as an asset rather than a 
burden.105 
The absence of serious crimes committed by Kadena personnel and the fact that 
there have been no aviation incidents that affected the surrounding community means 
that, overwhelmingly, protests and complaints center around aviation noise complaints. 
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According to the Kadena Air Base Public Affairs Officer, these protests come in the form 
of “ceremonial and peaceful event(s) where the town assembly will request to visit the 
base and present their demands/requests to wing leadership. I meet with most town 
assemblies to address their concerns and work to find solutions where possible. These 
meetings, in my view, are for the assemblies to show the community that they are taking 
action. This is a popular thing to do, because the two Okinawan newspapers will write 
about the protests (meetings).” According to Kadena’s Public Affairs Officer, behind 
closed doors, many of the officials delivering the protest or complaint acknowledge that 
the complaints lack merit, but the political gain to be made in having the Okinawa Times 
cite an official as “standing up against the bases” is too great to resist.106 
Kadena is also heavily involved in community engagement on many levels. At the 
annual Okinawa City International Carnival, the Airmen from Kadena play a major role 
in making the 300-meter rope used in the popular tug-o-war event. Kadena town and the 
base also partner in an extremely popular English language internship for local students. 
Even the Mayor of Kadena has expressed pride in the success of this program, which is 
surprising when one considers that many politicians in Okinawa are elected based on how 
extreme their anti-base stance is.107 There is also a tenant farmer program that allows 
local farmers to utilize some less used portions of the base to grow crops. It is difficult to 
imagine such programs and community activism succeeding if Kadena were as 
controversial as Futenma. The Marine Corps’ level of effort seems to be at least 
equivalent, but there is almost no local support for their efforts. 
3. Possible Contributing Factors 
It is likely that, as Dr. Eldridge asserts, Okinawans have a Marine Corps 
“allergy.” While the Air Force has its Japanese equivalent in the JASDF, there is simply 
no Japanese Marine Corps and the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps mission is  
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just incompatible with the pacifist norms of post-war Japanese and Okinawan politics. 
The relative level of understanding for the Air Force mission lends itself to a higher level 
of support for the base at Kadena. 
Also, Kadena itself, despite being a tremendous air base compared to the Okinawa 
Marine presence, creates a relatively small footprint both in area and in terms of number 
of personnel. While the Marines account for more than 50,000 personnel, Kadena houses 
fewer than 7,000 active duty Airmen. Kadena’s total acreage amounts to 11,000 acres, 
but the Marines take up nearly 40,000 acres.108 It is also largely self-contained and off-
base military traffic is limited. As a result, Calder’s Contact Hypothesis has less 
opportunity to play havoc with base–community relations. 
Aside from the above differences, Kadena shares most of the disadvantages of 
Futenma. The economic, social and demographic factors are also the same simply by 
virtue of being hosted by the same small island. Presence in Okinawa with its unique 
history and strongly anti-base political environment puts Kadena in the crosshairs any 
time there is a major U.S. related incident on the island. 
In fact, a possible argument for Kadena’s success is that anti-base activists are 
focusing their energies on Futenma and derailing the planned Henoko relocation. 
According to some, a success on that issue would simply encourage the leaders of that 
movement and the push to remove Kadena would begin.109 After all, according to 
Kadena Public Affairs Officer (PAO) Major Christopher Anderson, both the Okinawa 
Times and Ryukyu Shimpo “have a mission to reduce the presence of U.S. military on 
Okinawa. This is their stated objective that is written on their wall for all to see when we 
visited their offices.”110 Kadena is not immune to the anti-base activism on Okinawa. It 
is likely that it is simply benefiting from the focus on Futenma. 
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G. MCAS IWAKUNI: FUTENMA’S TWIN 
The last of my four case studies, Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, is worth 
examining for several reasons. Most obvious is the fact that it is a Marine Corps Air 
Station, even larger than Futenma, but located outside Okinawa on mainland Japan. 
According to the Department of Defense Base Structure Report, Iwakuni houses nearly 
4,000 Marines, almost three times as many as Futenma. It shares its mainland location 
with Yokosuka. Yamaguchi, the host prefecture, is also known as a relatively 
conservative area. From the time of the Meiji Restoration, that area of southern Japan, 
formerly known as Choshu, has produced more conservative Prime Ministers than any 
other area of the country.111 
The fact that it is another Marine Corps aviation facility that fields many of the 
same aircraft as Futenma and faces the relocation of the Navy’s air wing from Naval Air 
Station Atsugi makes it the perfect comparison to Futenma while controlling for the 
extreme influence of Okinawan history and political concerns specific to the island 
prefecture. I argue that the controversial nature of MCAS Futenma specifically, and 
Okinawan Marine Corps facilities in general, is not only a function of something unique 
to the Marines, but also a function of Okinawa’s unique history and political climate. 
1. Timeline of Flashpoints 
As with Kadena, and in contrast to both Futenma and Yokosuka, there is little 
record of any major media attention paid to crimes or incidents related to the Marines at 
Iwakuni in recent decades. There have been two major incidents of rape perpetrated by 
Marines assigned to Iwakuni, one in 2004112 and the other in 2007.113 The first involved 
a single Marine and the second in 2008 echoed the 1995 case in Okinawa in that four 
Marines were charged with the gang rape of a local woman in a van outside a nightclub. 
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On top of this, there are surely minor nuisance crimes like DUIs or disorderly 
behavior. However, there is little that has received any attention outside the Shinbun 
Akahata, the official newspaper of the Japanese Communist Party. Even the incidents 
listed there are traffic accidents and drunken vandalism for which victims are 
compensated in a timely manner. Nothing on the scale of the Okinawa or Yokosuka 
incidents exists in the public record. 
One issue that has arisen recently is the deployment of V-22 Osprey and the 
transfer of the Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi to Iwakuni. These developments certainly 
have the potential to generate considerable protest and opposition to the expansion of an 
already fairly large U.S. military installation. The Osprey deployment in Futenma has 
pressed anti-base activists to label it the “most dangerous airfield in the world.” Many 
have gone so far as to fly kites around the fence line of the base in an effort to interfere 
with flight operations there.114 
Iwakuni has been comparatively quiet. Some civic resistance to the transfer of the 
air wing and the Osprey deployment has registered in the Akahata115 and the Chuugoku 
Shinbun,116 but there has not been the mass resistance and public outcry found in 
Okinawa. In fact, according to a recent Yomiuri Shinbun poll, 54% of Iwakuni residents 
supported the Osprey deployment as long as “safety could be ensured.”117 While this 
might fall short of unconditional support, it certainly does not qualify as opposition. It 
also indicates that any resistance would simply be from a public safety standpoint as 
opposed to ideological or political opposition to the U.S. presence in general. 
2. General Level of Controversy 
MCAS Iwakuni, like Yokosuka and Kadena, enjoys a relatively positive 
atmosphere when it comes to host community relations. Aside from the obvious cause of 
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Okinawa’s unique political environment, there is no other reason that Iwakuni, which is a 
both larger and busier facility, should enjoy such a positive relationship with its host 
community while Futenma is the epicenter of controversy for the U.S.–Japan Alliance. 
Additionally, Major Neil Ruggiero, a Public Affairs Officer with extensive 
experience in both Okinawa and Iwakuni, cites the strong support of the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) compared with what he characterized as a consistent lack of support for 
the Okinawan Marines from the Okinawa Defense Bureau. He stated that the MOD is 
“very supportive of the base agreement” and often intercedes in issues of public 
complaints about aircraft noise.118 
As for the controversy surrounding the deployment of the V-22 Osprey, despite 
the positive reaction indicated by the Yomiuri poll, there have been some public 
demonstrations organized in opposition to the change. However, local activists, finding a 
lack of support from the immediate community, have turned to out of area recruitment in 
order to pad their numbers at protests. A majority of the Iwakuni protesters are bussed in 
by organizers from outside the prefecture. Consequently, the small protests that have 
occurred cannot be understood as “local” by any means. They are a result of a nation-
wide, left-wing, anti-military constituency and the small numbers119 that they are able to 
turn out even through such out of area recruitment are indicative of their lack of popular 
support. 
Aside from periodic public nuisance complaints regarding aviation noise, the 
level of controversy surrounding MCAS Iwakuni appears to be unremarkable. There is 
some evidence of anti-base sentiment in local newspapers and the fact that opposition 
groups are able to organize some popular protests (regardless of the non-indigenous 
nature of these protests) indicates that the resistance that does exist is part of a larger (and 
largely marginalized) anti-militarist constituency within the Japanese left as a whole. 
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3. Possible Contributing Factors 
While Iwakuni is nearly double the size of Futenma on its own, Iwakuni enjoys 
the advantage of not being situated with 50,000 other Marines scattered at other camps in 
the surrounding area. Iwakuni is its own entity. 
What little controversy does exist stems from aviation safety and noise issues.120 
The fact that Iwakuni is an air station cannot be helped. However, despite the expressed 
concerns of a vocal, non-local minority, these issues have not proven sufficient to 
develop any kind of critical mass or even a local expression of dissatisfaction with the 
base. As pointed out above, more than half of Iwakuni residents, barring any significant 
safety issues, even support expanding the role and mission of the base.121 
Also, as addressed earlier, the active support of the MOD is assessed by public 
affairs officials to be key both in maintaining positive base–community relations and 
defusing any potentially disruptive disputes before they gain traction. 
Yamaguchi Prefecture’s economy, while not as large or diverse as that of the 
Tokyo metropolitan area, dwarfs that of Okinawa prefecture. Both in terms of number of 
businesses per square kilometer and average household income, Yamaguchi vastly 
outstrips Okinawa. In terms of number of non-military foreigners residing in the 
prefecture, while Yamaguchi does not come close to Kanagawa’s nearly 2% foreign 
population, there are twice as many non-military foreigners as a percentage of population 
in Yamaguchi than in Okinawa. Also, since there are only the 3,000 or so Marines 
stationed directly at Iwakuni to contend with, any interaction a Yamaguchi resident has 
with a foreigner is at least equally likely to be with a civilian as with a Marine.122 
The Marines at Iwakuni also participate in a great deal of normal community 
outreach and open base type events.123 However, since they are not faced with the  
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overwhelming challenges that their fellow Marines on Okinawa deal with, they have not 
been forced to work at engaging the community at the high level seen at Futenma and 
Kadena. 
H. OVERALL MEASURES 
While establishing a precise statistical measurement of the level of base–
community relations at a given facility is difficult given the lack of attention paid to this 
issue outside of the facilities in Okinawa, the interviews and research I have conducted 
have allowed me to at least make a general assessment of the level of controversy at these 
four bases beyond a simple anecdotal level. 
Clearly, and least surprising, Futenma is the most controversial base in Japan. It 
may be the most controversial base in the entire DoD inventory. Okinawa’s history, 
political culture, the tremendous demographic pressure of the number of U.S. bases 
located within the prefecture, and the frequency of major crimes and incidents that have 
taken place there combine to form a “perfect storm” of controversy around MCAS 
Futenma. Since the 2009 general election, when Prime Minister Hatoyama campaigned 
on “reevaluating” the relocation agreement, the situation has just been exacerbated. On 
top of that the deployment of the Osprey has contributed to make the worst of an already 
bad situation. 
Kadena Air Base is next most controversial base. Despite enjoying a relatively 
benign relationship with the immediately surrounding communities, Okinawa’s political 
climate combined with all the problems that make Futenma so controversial act to put 
Kadena “at risk” of becoming another sore spot in the alliance as a whole. It is entirely 
conceivable that if the Futenma Problem is ever resolved, Kadena could become the next 
target of the anti-base activists in Okinawa Prefecture.124 
MCAS Iwakuni is by contrast much less controversial. All indications point to the 
base enjoying broad support within the immediate community and Yamaguchi Prefecture 
as a whole. Complaints revolving around aviation noise are certainly not to be completely 
                                                 
124. Eldridge, telephone interview. 
 47 
disregarded, but close coordination with local MOD official seems to keep a lid on 
anything that might otherwise boil over into widespread dissatisfaction with the base and 
its operations. Certainly, its smaller footprint overall when compared with the entire 
Marine Corps presence in Okinawa decreases the risk of mass media publicized crimes 
that could damage the base’s standing in the community. There does appear to be a vocal 
and organized minority of people who manage to garner enough outside support to put on 
regular demonstrations against the base’s proposed expansion, but this has not been 
sufficient to undermine the support of the actual host community. 
Yokosuka, despite a presence that is at least on the same order of magnitude as 
the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa and a recent history of well-publicized violent 
crimes perpetrated by Sailors in the community, appears to be the least controversial of 
the four case studies. The 2009 arrival of USS George Washington was expected to 
dramatically increase the local opposition to the U.S. Navy’s presence. However, three 
years on, even in the wake of the nuclear disaster at Fukushima, such fears appear to have 
been largely unfounded. As with Iwakuni, there is a small contingent of anti-base 
activism, mostly centered around the Japanese Communist Party. But their major events 
need to be framed not as “anti-base” demonstrations, but rather as “peace festivals.”125 
This is likely due to the overwhelmingly positive attitude of Kanagawa residents to the 
base presence. The upcoming Yokosuka Peace Festival is expected to draw most of its 
participation by including performances by Japanese pop-stars and building the festival 
around family friendly activities found at any festival in Japan. The activism that will be 
on display is expected to be just two “information booths” on nuclear propulsion and the 
V-22 Osprey and it is anticipated that these will largely be relegated to a side-show 
status, something for families to ignore as they walk from food stands to the music 
stage.126 
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III. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have attempted to conduct a comparative study of the base 
community relations across four different installations: Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma, Naval Station Yokosuka, Kadena Air Force Base, and Marine Corps Air 
Station Iwakuni. Since little has been written either in academic literature or the popular 
press on community base relations at facilities outside of Okinawa, this thesis, in 
examining and comparing the state of relations at four separate facilities, points to some 
interesting conclusions. First and most glaring is that base relations throughout Japan are 
not equal. There is a vast spectrum with the controversy surrounding MCAS Futenma on 
one end and the relatively pacific relations at Yokosuka Naval Base at the other end. 
For a number of reasons, Futenma is by far the most controversial of the four 
bases. Located in Okinawa, the political climate is such that the removal of the base is the 
stated objective of local officials, both local newspapers, and the activists of the anti-base 
movement. Okinawa’s unique history as essentially a “double colonized” island chain 
puts all the bases there at a disadvantage in their efforts for constructive base–community 
relations. Additionally, Futenma is part of the larger USMC presence. The Marines are an 
organization that has no analogous counterpart in the Japanese military establishment 
and, in the eyes of Okinawan activists at least, does not contribute directly to the stated 
goal of “defense of Japan.” Rather, the Marines are focused on expeditionary warfare, 
most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also potentially for contingencies on the 
Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan Straits. 
Additionally, the dispersed nature of the Marine Corps facilities island-wide 
makes for added difficulties brought on by large truck convoys and the associated traffic 
and noise problems they generate. As a percentage of the prefecture’s population, the 
Marines are the largest presence of any of the four case studies. Simply stated, there are a 
ton of Marines on the island and this greater visibility makes them an easy target for the 
opposition movement. 
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Futenma is further hampered in its efforts to peacefully coexist with the city of 
Ginowan and the prefecture as a whole by the fact that it is an air base that fields some of 
the largest and noisiest helicopters in the U.S. military inventory. This problem has been 
exacerbated by the recent deployment of the V-22 Osprey, an airframe which, at its 
outset, had a notorious safety record and was once touted as the number one “worst 
aircraft of all time.” While its safety record has considerably improved since initial 
fielding, the anti-base activists have seized on the negative reports of the Ospreys’ safety 
to call Futenma the “world’s most dangerous airfield.” 
Perhaps, however, the most important factor in making Futenma the most 
controversial is simply that it is the easiest target for anti-base activists. The factors listed 
above, aviation safety and noise complaints, traffic associated with the larger Marine 
Corps presence, and Okinawa’s unique history and political climate, combined with the 
fact that Okinawa Prefecture is the least educated and economically developed of Japan’s 
prefectures and hosts the smallest number of non-military foreigners, place MCAS 
Futenma at the center of the bull’s eye for anti-base activists. Former Prime Minister 
Hatoyama’s declaration of intent to push for Futenma to be relocated outside of Okinawa 
Prefecture despite previous U.S.-Japan agreements to the contrary and his subsequent 
inability to deliver on that promise made Futenma the focal point of the anti-base 
movement in Okinawa and, to the extent that it exists, in Japan at large. 
Kadena suffers the next highest amount of tension. Collocation on Okinawa is the 
largest factor in making this so. Kadena also shares some of the same concerns about 
aviation noise and safety. While in the past personnel assigned to Kadena have not been 
involved in serious crimes to the extent found at some of the other facilities in this study, 
the recent arrest of an Airman for trespassing and assault have done nothing to increase 
separation between itself and Futenma. 
Iwakuni, while in a dissimilar political climate, shares many attributes with 
Futenma. Namely, it is also a Marine Corps Air Station currently fielding the 
controversial Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and facing the additional relocation of the Naval 
Air Wing from Atsugi. Aviation noise and safety concerns are paramount for the base 
public affairs officials. However, Yamaguchi Prefecture does not share the same cultural 
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and political traditions that make the bases on Okinawa so controversial. There is no 
history of strong anti-militarism and, overall, people are at least accepting if not 
supportive of the base presence. Iwakuni also enjoys the full support of local Ministry of 
Defense officials who often serve as mediators between concerned citizens and the 
Marines there. This is an advantageous relationship that neither of the bases in Okinawa 
enjoys with the Okinawa Defense Bureau.127 
Yokosuka, the least controversial of the four case studies, is also conveniently the 
most geographically distant from Okinawa. It also benefits from the fact that the city of 
Yokosuka has a long history as a “Navy Town” going back all the way to the Meiji 
Restoration. Despite the two high-profile murders in the last decade, the presence of the 
USS George Washington, and the potential for Yokosuka to be a target in a U.S. conflict 
with a third party, the political and demographic realities of Kanagawa Prefecture prevent 
the public backlash that occurs in Okinawa from plaguing the base there. The naval base 
enjoys a close working relationship of cooperation and coordination with local officials, 
politicians, and civic groups.128 As a naval facility, Yokosuka also benefits from the lack 
of air operations, so noise and public safety are not of primary concern. The base is also 
largely self contained so there are none of the traffic issues that are a problem for the 
Marine Corps on Okinawa. It is also interesting to note that, of the four case studies, 
Yokosuka is the only base that keeps a careful record of the exact number of anti-base 
demonstrations that do occur.129 While these are nothing on the scale of the protests in 
Okinawa, they do exist and Yokosuka public affairs personnel keep tabs on both the 
frequency and size of the protests that do occur. This may indicate the seriousness with 
which the base leadership takes its mission of promoting harmonious community 
relations. It may also, however, illustrate the futility of the efforts of the bases in 
Okinawa to do the same. 
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A. POSSIBLE POLICY RECCOMMENDATIONS 
The conclusions I have reached in this thesis point to several possible policy 
recommendations that could either help improve base-community relations at an 
individual installation, or at least guide leaders in dealing with the tension that 
controversy creates in the alliance as a whole. Taking steps to limit the amount of civic 
disruption a base causes is an obvious first step. While there is probably not a lot that can 
be done to allay concerns about aviation noise at an air base, a concerted campaign to 
educate the public about the more recent safety record of the Osprey would probably be 
helpful. Particularly in Iwakuni, where safety was cited as the only reason the majority of 
the citizenry would oppose the Osprey deployment, this could be effective. In Okinawa, 
where both local newspapers are aligned against the U.S. military presence, and have 
actively resisted printing anything positive about the U.S. presence whatsoever, this 
might prove more problematic. 
In terms of the traffic issues caused by truck convoys, efforts to limit the 
frequency with which these convoys traverse the public roads or restricting them to low 
traffic hours (for example late evening or very early morning) might reduce both 
visibility and the traffic problems associated with this kind of movement. 
Preventing the commission of crimes by service members, while certainly 
desirable and a worthy goal for its own sake, is likely to be ineffective. Educating service 
members with mandatory programs like Yokosuka’s Area Orientation Brief is a good 
idea, but further restricting liberty range and hours (as has been the response for all U.S. 
Forces in Japan in the wake of the recent events in Okinawa) will have little effect on 
crimes of this nature. The reality is both of the Yokosuka murderers were already in an 
Unauthorized Absence status when they committed their crimes.130 In short, these Sailors 
were already violating regulations. Crimes like this are generally not committed by 
personnel who are operating under established parameters. Forcing service members and 
their dependents who follow the rules to return to their residences by a given hour does 
nothing to stop the few people who flout the rules as a matter of course from committing 
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violent crimes in the community. Short of a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement to 
allow Japanese law enforcement increased jurisdiction for crimes committed outside the 
base, nothing is likely to mollify citizens for whom this is a primary concern and even 
this will not stop the actual crime itself. An appropriate and timely response that holds the 
individuals responsible not if, but when these tragic events occur is the only course of 
action. The collective restriction of movement for all U.S. service members only punishes 
the local businesses that depend on military customers for their livelihood. 
As for what to do about Futenma, some have asserted that the best course of 
action is simply to acquiesce to activists’ demands for closure or out of prefecture 
relocation. However, the history of the Okinawan anti-base movement indicates that this 
would be a poor choice. Far from being satisfied by such an outcome, a victory over 
MCAS Futenma would only serve to embolden the anti-base movement and urge them 
forward to push for removal of one base after another. The re-ignition of popular protest 
in the wake of the DPJ victory in 2009 proves this correct. Once Futenma is gone, the rest 
of the Marine Corps camps in Okinawa would be next, and then Kadena, all of which are 
important, but collectively represent a vital U.S. security interest in the region. 
Compromise is clearly called for. However, the political climate within Okinawa makes 
dialogue difficult and the prospect for resolution unlikely. Perhaps policy makers in the 
United States and Japan can take some comfort in the realization that as intractable as the 
issues that surround MCAS Futenma seem, they are largely limited to that facility and the 
other bases in Japan and the alliance itself are not nearly so troubled. 
 54 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 55 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Airports Council International. “Aircraft Noise and Community Relations.” Airports 
Council International Position Brief, 2010. 
Calder, Kent. Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 










Cooley, Alexander. Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008. 
Fackler, Martin. “Arrests of 2 U.S. Sailors in Rape Case Threaten to Fan Okinawa’s 
Anger.” New York Times. October 16, 2012. 
Google. Accessed May 30, 2012. http://www.google.com. 
Harris, Tobias. “Observing Japan.” Accessed May 30, 2012. 
http://www.observingjapan.com/2008/04/yokosuka-is-different.html. 
Japan Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards) & 
Statistical Research and Training Institute. “Statistics Bureau Home 
Page/Statistical Maps of Japan.” 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chiri/map/index.htm. 
Johnson, Chalmers. Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic. New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2007. 
Klingner, Bruce and Dean Cheng. “U.S. Asian Policy: America’s Security Commitment 
to Asia Needs More Forces.” Backgrounder #2715 (August 2012). 
McCormack, Gavan. “The U.S.–Japan ‘Alliance’, Okinawa, and Three Looming 
Elections.” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Accessed November 16, 
2012. 
McCormack, Gavan and Satoko Oka Norimatsu. Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts 
Japan and the United States. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012. 
 56 
McCurry, Justin. “Japan Plans to End Reliance on Nuclear Power in 30 Years.” 
Guardian. September 14, 2012. 
Mochizuki, Mike and Michael O’Hanlon. “The Unnecessary Crisis: A Proposed 
Compromise on Futenma.” The Oriental Economist (January 2010). 
Osius, Ted. The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance: Why it Matters and How to Strengthen It. 
Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002. 
“Osprey: Coming Again to Iwakuni.” Chuugoku Shinbun. October 24, 2012. 
“Osprey Deployment: Japan and America Cooperating to Prevent Deterioration of 
Alliance.” Yomiuri Shinbun, July 25, 1012. 
“Osprey Opposition Broadens,” Shinbun Akahata, September 3, 2012. 
Packard, III, George R. Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1966. 
Scott, Simon. “Yokosuka Rape Victim Takes Fight for Justice to U.S. Courts.” Japan 
Times. August 14, 2012. 
Tritten, Travis J. “At Iwakuni, Realignment Will Go As Planned.” Stars and Stripes. 
February 23, 2010. 
Tritten, Travis J. and Chiyomi Sumida. “Four Marines Held at Iwakuni in Alleged Rape 
of Japanese Woman.” Stars and Stripes. October 21, 2007. 
Tyler, Greg and Hana Kusumoto. “Iwakuni Marine Denies He Was Seeking to Rape.” 
Stars and Stripes. February 7, 2004. 
“U.S. Airman, Convicted of Rape.” CNN World. Accessed November 17, 2012. 
http://articles.cnn.com/2002–03–27/world/japan.rape_1_japanese-woman-
timothy-woodland-okinawa-s-kadena-air-base?_s=PM:asiapcf. 
U.S. Department of Defense. Base Structure Report, 2012. 
Weaver, Teri and Hana Kusumoto. “Major Crimes Among Military Down in Japan.” 
Stars and Stripes, February 10, 2008. Accessed June 8, 2012. 
http://www.stripes.com/news/major-crimes-among-military-down-in-japan-
1.74689. 
Yeo, Andrew. Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
